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The happiest outcomes of the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) result when those charged with reporting on a topic elucidate the existing law with maximum objectivity and accuracy and when, where desired, they formulate such possibilities for its avowed progressive development as find a solid basis in emerging practice or international jurisprudence and are unlikely to arouse implacable opposition among members of the Commission or member states of the General Assembly. This history should be foremost in the minds of those presently leading the Commission's work on the immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction as they come next session to report on possible limitations on and exceptions to such immunity. Whether the eventual aim is codification or reform, any consideration of this most controverted and combustible of contemporary questions of international law that is not based on an impartial and convincing assessment of relevant state practice and international case-law and that misreads the political temper of the times will end in tears, in the Commission itself and even more so in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly.
What follows seeks to avert wailing and gnashing of teeth by providing a prophylactic dose of reality. 1 Focusing on alleged exceptions to the immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction when the charges specify international crimes, it sets out some home truths of which serious account must be taken if the ILC's work on the immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction is to bear fruit.
Positive Law
It is hard to see how a dispassionate, rigorous observer could genuinely believe that there currently exists under customary international law any form of "international crime" exception to the immunity, ratione personae or ratione materiae, from foreign criminal jurisdiction from which a state is entitled to see its serving and former officials benefit.
As regards immunity ratione personae, the absence of any "international crime" exception is plain. The ICJ's categorical ruling in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 that no exception existed in respect of allegations of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity to the immunity ratione personae from which a serving minister for foreign affairs was said to benefit 2 -and, by parity of reasoning, that no exception existed in respect of any alleged international crime to any species of immunity ratione personae-has been welcomed by the overwhelming majority of governments, applied by a host of national courts, accepted by the bulk of the ILC when discussing the first special rapporteur's conclusion to the same effect, 3 queried by less than a handful of delegations to the Sixth Committee in the same context, and considered "not disputed" by a PreTrial Chamber of the International Criminal Court. 4 When it comes to immunity ratione materiae, the situation is less settled but, in the final analysis, little different. 5 Only on the most skewed approach to the identification of rules of customary international law could one currently discern any form of "international crime" exception to the immunity ratione materiae from foreign criminal jurisdiction from which a state is entitled to see its officials and ex-officials benefit. 6 Indeed, there is nothing even approaching the widespread and representative concordance of state practice and concomitant opinio juris necessary for a rule of customary international law. Nor, for that matter, does practice or international jurisprudence exhibit any trend in favour of an "international crime" exception to immunity ratione materiae. If anything, a smattering of swallows has provoked a backlash against summer. The sparse, ambivalent body of national judicial and since-abrogated legislative practice against the availability of immunity ratione materiae in this context is counterbalanced by a sparse body of national judicial and prosecutorial practice and several pointed dicta from the ICJ 7 in favour of immunity. Moreover, those very few jurisdictions that have declined to afford immunity in the few cases to have proceeded so far to judicial determination have all been western European. Conversely, African states jointly and severally, Chile, China, Israel, Mongolia and the United States-many of them states with a strong claim to being considered "specially affected" by any purported customary "international crime" exception-have all vociferously insisted on the grant of immunity ratione materiae to their serving and former officials in the face of foreign investigations or proceedings pertaining to alleged international crimes. (As it is, even in the relevant western European jurisdictions, the positions staked out by the courts or by individual investigating magistrates are not necessarily shared by the executive or legislative branches.) As for the little discussion to date in the Sixth Committee, only Belgium, Italy, Peru and Singapore are on record as suggesting de lege lata that there exists no obligation to afford immunity ratione materiae in criminal proceedings alleging international crimes, while China, France and Russia are on record to the contrary.
Legal Principle
The legal reasoning underpinning varieties of supposed "international crime" exception to the immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction has fared poorly before the ICJ. Most damagingly, in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State the ICJ drew attention to what it saw as the fundamental flaw in any argument against immunity founded on the alleged international unlawfulness of the respondent's conduct, namely that it is premised on the outcome of adjudication on the merits, whereas the barring of adjudication on the merits is the essence of immunity. Highlighting this "logical problem," 8 the Court elaborated:
Immunity from jurisdiction is . . . necessarily preliminary in nature. Consequently a national court is required to determine whether or not a foreign State is entitled to immunity as a matter of international law before it can hear the merits of the case brought before it and before the facts have been established. If immunity were to be dependent upon the State actually having committed a serious violation of international human rights law or the law of armed conflict, then it would become necessary for the national court to hold an enquiry into the merits in order to determine whether it had jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, the mere allegation that the State had committed such wrongful acts were to be sufficient to deprive the State of its entitlement to immunity, immunity could, in effect, be negated simply by skilful construction of the claim. 9 The Court's insight is equally applicable to foreign criminal proceedings against serving or former state officials in respect of alleged international crimes. In the same judgment, the ICJ systematically and unsparingly rebutted jus cogens-based arguments against the availability of immunity from foreign jurisdiction. 10 In doing so, moreover, while posting the formal caveat that the case before it related only to civil proceedings against the state sued as such, the Court went out of its way to include the following account of Arrest Warrant in its reasoning:
In Arrest Warrant, albeit without express reference to the concept of jus cogens, that the fact that a Minister for Foreign Affairs was accused of criminal violations of rules which undoubtedly possess the character of jus cogens did not deprive the Democratic Republic of the Congo of the entitlement which it possessed as a matter of customary international law to demand immunity on his behalf. 11 In Arrest Warrant itself, the ICJ equally dismissed arguments against immunity founded on the combined effect of the mandatory extraterritorial jurisdiction and the obligation aut dedere aut judicare together included in multilateral treaties in the field of international criminal law, 12 stating that, although various international conventions on the prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes impose on States obligations of prosecution or extradition [and] .5, where the court speaks, more than a little optimistically, of "a manifest tendency on the international plane to want to restrict the immunity of (former) heads of state in cases of crimes pertaining to jus cogens" (author's translation). The ratio of the decision, however, as evident id., para. 5.4.3, appears ultimately premised on the court's reading of an official statement made by Swiss legislators when enacting into Swiss law the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. It is also worth noting that the decision of the Swiss minister challenged before the court predates the ICJ's dicta in Jurisdictional Immunities, as do all the pleadings in the challenge bar the réplique (two days after the ICJ's judgment) and the duplique (two months later), neither of which could by that point have incorporated the ICJ's jurisprudence.jurisdiction, [this] in no way affects immunities under customary international law, including those of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. 13 Such immunities, the Court stressed, "remain opposable before the courts of a foreign State, even where those courts exercise such a jurisdiction under these conventions." 14 In the same case, in which immunity ratione personae alone was at issue, the Court, having fashioned a pretext on which also to mention immunity ratione materiae, observed:
Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of one State may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity. 15 In this way the ICJ did not just implicitly reject the claim that immunity ratione materiae poses no bar under customary international law to the foreign prosecution of a serving or former state official for an alleged international crime. The Court's cunning reference to the unavailability of immunity ratione materiae in respect of acts performed "in a private capacity"-rather than to the availability of immunity in respect of acts performed in an official capacity, or to "official acts," both of which might have been read down to exclude acts under mere colour of officialdom-takes aim at the argument 16 that, rather than implicating an exception, international crimes do not attract immunity ratione materiae in the first place. 17 While these statements have all been by way of dicta and are only subsidiary means for the determination of the law at issue, 18 it would be wilful blindness to fail to register their message.
Political Will
It would be a mistake to think that there exists among member states of the General Assembly the political will for the acceptance, even by explicit way of progressive development, of an "international crime" exception to the immunity of state officials, ratione personae or materiae, from foreign criminal jurisdiction. The reality manifest except to those who will not see is that, beyond a minority of states, there is little diplomatic appetite for foreign prosecutions for alleged international crimes of state officials and ex-officials otherwise benefiting under customary international law from immunity.
Whatever the rights and wrongs, state practice-from the concerted fury of African states and the stern rebuke of China, Israel and the United States in relevant cases to the signal absence of any groundswell of opposition among delegates to the Sixth Committee to the first special rapporteur's rejection of an "international crime" exception to immunity, ratione personae or materiae-indicates that a substantial number of states, at the very least, simply do not want their officials or affairs adjudicated on in foreign criminal courts without their consent. This is so, for that matter, even in what tends to be the less embarrassing context of common crimes. Consider the current dispute between Italy and India over the latter's arrest and declared intention to prosecute two Italian marines for killing Indian nationals in the course of duty 19 or the recent spat between India and the United States over the arrest and prosecution of an Indian consular official in New York City. 20 Consider too the expansive provision for immunity, ratione personae and materiae, from foreign criminal jurisdiction in the raft of diplomatic, consular and cognate conventions, status of forces and status of mission agreements, and the like. When it comes specifically to international crimes, African states, for their part, as their Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights of 27 June 2014 shows, go so far as to oppose the nonconsensual prosecution of their high-ranking officials even before an international court created by them and their peers and to whose statute they are party.
That said, some states seem confident that their own serving and former officials will never be prosecuted for international crimes in foreign courts or seem content to waive any immunity that might serve to shield notorious figures from their own past regimes. But even a number of these states appear reluctant, for diplomatic or other reasons, to see their own courts used for private prosecutions of foreign officials and ex-officials without the consent of the accused's state.
Conclusion and Future Directions
The challenge for the ILC's scholarly, well-intentioned second special rapporteur on the immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction is that a solid body of members of the Commission and of states in the Sixth Committee will view a refusal to face or an attempt to face down the realities highlighted here as special pleading and will give it the shortest of shrifts. The spectacle will not be edifying. What is "essential," therefore, in the words of members of the Commission at its most recent session, is "that there be transparency and an informed debate on whatever choices [are] to be made and on the direction to be taken." 21 It is to be hoped that the perhaps-unpalatable truths outlined here are taken as starting points from which the special rapporteur might seek to suggest more lateral-thinking ways of resolving circumstantial tensions between the moral imperatives of international criminal justice and the prudential desiderata of friendly relations among states.
What such lateral thinking might involve would be for the special rapporteur and the Commission to determine, taking into account comments by states. That said, one idea might be to propose by way of progressive development a draft article, applicable to immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae alike, along the following lines:
